Secrecy and Covert Communications against UAV Surveillance via Multi-Hop
  Networks by Wang, Hui-Ming et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
09
19
7v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  2
1 O
ct 
20
19
1
Secrecy and Covert Communications against
UAV Surveillance via Multi-Hop Networks
Hui-Ming Wang, Senior Member, IEEE, Yan Zhang, Xu Zhang,
and Zhetao Li, Member, IEEE
Abstract
The deployment of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for surveillance and monitoring gives rise to the
confidential information leakage challenge in both civilian and military environments. The security and
covert communication problems for a pair of terrestrial nodes against UAV surveillance are considered
in this paper. To overcome the information leakage and increase the transmission reliability, a multi-hop
relaying strategy is deployed. We aim to optimize the throughput by carefully designing the parameters
of the multi-hop network, including the coding rates, transmit power, and required number of hops. In the
secure transmission scenario, the expressions of the connection probability and secrecy outage probability
of an end-to-end path are derived and the closed-form expressions of the optimal transmit power,
transmission and secrecy rates under a fixed number of hops are obtained. In the covert communication
problem, under the constraints of the detection error rate and aggregate power, the sub-problem of
transmit power allocation is a convex problem and can be solved numerically. Simulation shows the
impact of network settings on the transmission performance. The trade-off between secrecy/covertness
and efficiency of the multi-hop transmission is discussed which leads to the existence of the optimal
number of hops.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
The potentially wide applications of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), both in military and
civilian fields, have given rise to a significant research enthusiasm in the academic society re-
cently. Due to the advantages such as high mobility and low cost, UAVs have been widely applied
as platforms in security monitoring, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, environmental
inspections and so on. UAVs have also been highly promising for playing an important role in
future wireless communication systems [1]. Taking advantage of line-of-sight (LoS) connections
established in the UAV-assisted communication systems, the coverage and quality-of-service
(QoS) of the networks can be enhanced efficiently. Owing to their controllable mobility and
cost-effective deployment, UAVs can work as aerial base stations to provide offloading services
in extremely crowded areas and to enable communications when terrestrial networks are damaged
due to sudden natural disasters [2]–[4]. In addition, they can be used as mobile relays to establish
wireless connectivity for distant users that cannot communicate with each other by reliable direct
links [5], [6].
To facilitate an effective UAV communication and to evaluate its performance, it is crucial
to characterize the air-to-ground wireless channel accurately and establish reliable analytical
channel models. In [7], [8], the authors assume that the air-to-ground channel is dominated by a
LoS link and therefore follows the free-space pass loss model. To further take into account the
small-scale fading, in [9], [10], the channel is considered following the Rayleigh fading model.
While in [11] and [12], the terrestrial-aerial channels are considered as a combination of LoS and
scattered components, and are modeled as Nakagami-n and Rician fading models, respectively.
In [13] and [14], a hybrid model with the LoS and non-line-of-sight (NLoS) components as well
as the corresponding occurrence probabilities is considered. The probability of LoS is related
to the environment and the elevation angle of the communication link. We can see that due to
the large elevation angle, the LoS component of the air-to-ground channel is dominant and the
channel quality is generally much better than the terrestrial fading channel, where the blockage,
shadowing effect and various scatters deteriorate the channel significantly.
A. Motivation
However, the UAVs bring in challenges to information security society. Due to the openness
of wireless media and the broadcast nature of wireless communications, any receiver located in
the cover range of the transmitter can receive the transmitted signal. UAVs can be deployed as an
October 22, 2019
3eavesdropper, which gives rise to the confidential information leakage of wireless transmissions.
Especially, benefiting from the advantages of the air-to-ground channel properties compared
with those of the terrestrial channel [7] - [15], UAVs are highly likely to intercept or detect the
transmitted signals when the source node communicates with the receiver directly under severe
terrestrial fading channels. One recent work [16] considers the scenario in which the UAV acts as
a surveillance to eavesdrop the transmissions between the suspicious transceivers on the ground.
The eavesdropping performance is improved by jamming the suspicious communication. In [17]
a multi-antenna UAV full-duplex eavesdropper wiretaps and jams the communication between the
transmiter and receiver simultaneously by adjusting its transmit and receive beamforming vectors.
In order to confront such threatens, it is of great importance to explore methods protecting the
legitimate transmission and preventing information from being intercepted or detected by the
hostile UAVs.
To deal with the secure transmission problem, the traditional methods are mainly based on
encryption technologies and other higher layer security protocols. More recently, physical layer
security (PLS) has emerged as a complementary and promising security solution to guarantee
communication secrecy [18]. Utilizing the physical characteristics of the wireless channels,
PLS can achieve transmission secrecy in the sense of information theoretical security [19].
This solution has been widely applied in various wireless networks, such as 5G networks [20],
heterogeneous networks [21], [22], cooperative relay networks [23], etc. Recently, a number of
studies have applied PLS to improve the security of the UAV communication systems in which
the UAV works as part of the legitimate communication systems. For instance, [15] and [8]
investigate the secure communication with UAV receivers in the presence of passive and active
eavesdroppers, respectively. [24] and [25] studied the trajectory and power control problems
for UAV-ground systems under one potential ground eavesdroppers and multiple eavesdroppers
with imperfect knowledge of locations, respectively. [26] investigated another scenario where
one legitimate monitor tries to improve its eavesdropping capability toward a UAV-aided system
via proactive jamming.
PLS is in the sense that the eavesdropper can receive the signal but can not demodulate it
to obtain the correct information bits. To further improve the security, the transmitter may wish
to send messages through the wireless links without being detected by potential eavesdroppers.
In other word, the eavesdropper may not realize the existence of a wireless communication
activity. This is also called as low probability of detection (LPD), or, covert communication
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4[27]. The basic theory and the performance limit of the covert communication in additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel are discussed in [27] which indicates that at most O(√n) bits
can be transmitted to the legitimate receiver reliably in n channel uses, without being detected
by the warden. The asymptotic behavior has also been investigated in other kinds of channels
such as the discrete memoryless channel and the binary symmetric channel [28], [29]. Based on
these pioneering works, the covert communication has been studied under many circumstances,
such as noise uncertainty [30], channel information uncertainty [31], finite blocklength [32], and
multi-hop routing network [33].
From the previous discussion, we have known that the air-to-ground channels have better
characteristics and are modeled differently comparing with terrestrial links, which would increase
the stress of communication networks on information confidentiality, as well as result in different
considerations conclusions when considering network designing problems in such circumstances.
With the increasingly wider application of UAV in communication and its potential threaten
toward information security, secure and covert communications under aerial surveillance require
in-depth studies. However, only a few research works consider this scenario. To the best of
our knowledge, only [16] and [17] discussed the PLS transmission with UAV wiretappers.
Yet the two works studied ways to improve the eavesdropping performance, not to confront
UAV’s wiretapping and guarantee secure transmission from the terrestrial network’s perspective.
In addition, no previous work has investigated the LPD communication problem under the
surveillance of the UAV.
B. Contributions of Our Work
In this paper, we evaluate and optimize the secrecy and covert communications, respectively,
between a transmitter and a receiver on the ground surveilled by a UAV. As previously mentioned,
the advantages of the air-to-ground channels compared with the terrestrial channels lead to
the proneness of legitimate information leakage and detection. Specially, the transmitted signal
combating the severe fading of the terrestrial channel to be received reliably at the destination
is more inclined to be wiretapped by the UAV. To solve this problem, one helpful solution is
adopting multi-hop strategy, i.e., multiple intermediate nodes relay the signals from the source to
the destination. On one hand, the multi-hop strategy will strengthen the connection of terrestrial
network. On the other hand, the transmit power of each node would be reduced sharply compared
to the direct transmission from the source to destination, which could drastically decrease the
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5probability of being discovered and detected by the hostile UAV. This strategy is especially
suitable for networks with limited energy and large distance between the source-destination pair,
compared with other ways sending signals directly to the destination, e.g. the cooperative remote
jamming method in [34].
We need to address that there naturally exists a non-trivial trade-off between the secrecy/covertness
and the efficiency of the multi-hop transmission, which is highly related to the number of hops
and the transmit power of each node. With fewer hops, the transmit power allocated to each node
should be sufficiently large in order to guarantee the QoS and avoid connection outage in each
hop, which increases the risk of being wiretapped. On the other hand, the transmit power could
be reduced with more hops to avoid the information leakage, but the effective throughput of the
network would be influenced which may lead to a lower efficiency. In addition, too many hops
will also increase the risk of being detected. Therefore, the design and optimization of system
parameters for the security and covert transmissions using multi-hop relaying is the main focus
of this paper.
In our work, the randomness with regard to the LoS and NLoS characteristics is considered
when modeling the air-to-ground channels. The channel between one ground device and the UAV
can either be LoS or NLoS, and is modeled with different channel coefficients under LoS and
NLoS conditions, which is a significant difference from terrestrial wiretapping circumstances.
Under the proposed multi-hop transmission strategy, our objective is to maximize the throughput
by optimizing the network parameters including the coding rates, transmit power, and required
number of hops. In the secure transmission problem, the secrecy outage probability must be kept
under a tolerant level. While in the covert communication problem, the detection error rate at
the UAV is required to be higher than a predetermined threshold. The main contributions are
summarized as follows:
1) For the secrecy transmission problem, the exact expressions of the connection probability
and the secrecy outage probability of an end-to-end path are derived. The secrecy throughput
maximization problem under the constraints of the secrecy outage probability as well as the
aggregate transmit power is discussed. The closed-form expressions of the optimal transmit
power, transmission and secrecy rates are obtained. Further more, the optimal trade-off with
respect to the transmission security and efficiency is evaluated.
2) For the covert communication problem, the detection error rate is used to measure the
covertness performance, and a lower boundary is constructed using the relative entropy between
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6the two joint distributions under different hypotheses. The optimization of transmit power at each
hop turns to be a convex optimization problem and could be solved numerically. The expression
of the optimal transmission rate is also derived, and the optimal number of hops is evaluated.
Note that though there exist some differences between the secrecy and covert communications
in problem construction and solving procedures, the considered problems in secrecy and covert
communication parts are closely related. First, both problems aim to guarantee the transmission
security in the multi-hop networks. Secrecy communication prevents information being demod-
ulated and covert communication conceals the transmission from being detected by the UAV.
Second, there exists a trade-off between the security and efficiency in both secrecy and covert
communications. The increase of number of hops will degrade UAV’s wiretapping and detecting
ability and result in the increase of transmission rate, but more time for receiving information will
be required and more chances for wiretapping/detecting signals will be provided. In addition, both
problems maximize the end-to-end throughput, and the opposite influence of transmission rate on
connection probability and the coding rate which are two important component of the throughput
leads to the existence of optimal secrecy rate in secrecy communication and transmissions rate
in covert communication.
C. Related Works
More recently, PLS and covert communications have also been extended to multi-hop re-
laying systems [33], [35]–[37]. Specifically, in [33], the optimal path is chosen for a covert
communication network in the presence of multiple collaborating wardens. [35] focuses on the
secure routing and power allocation problem with the deployment of cooperative jamming and
the knowledge of the eavesdroppers, while [36] deals with the routing and power optimization
under randomly distributed eavesdroppers and one multi-antenna jammer. In [37], the design
and secrecy performance of a linear multi-hop network with randomly distributed eavesdroppers
are analyzed under on-off and non-on-off transmission schemes respectively. The aforementioned
works all consider the terrestrial eavesdropping/detecting circumstances, which quite differs from
our aerial surveillance scenario and have different research targets from ours.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, the system model of the
multi-hop relay network is presented, and the secrecy transmission optimization problem as
well as the covert communication problem are formulated. In Section III, the parameters of
the network are optimized sequentially. The solution of the covert communication problem is
October 22, 2019 DRAFT
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Fig. 1: The system model with linear multi-hop relaying network eavesdropped by UAV.
provided in Section IV. Section V presents the numerical results and Section VI draws the
conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the communication between one pair of source and destination nodes with distance
D. One UAV in the air monitors any suspicious communication and wiretaps the transmitted
signal. To avoid being detected by the UAV and to guarantee the security transmission, the multi-
hop relaying is deployed and the decode-and-forward (DF) protocol is considered for confidential
signal convey. The source, destination, relays, as well as the UAV are all equipped with a single
omnidirectional antenna, respectively. We assume that the UAV has a fixed location in the air
which is known by the ground network. The relays are placed equidistantly on the line from the
source to the destination, so as to simplify the investigation toward the influence of the number
of hops [38]. Supposing that there are N − 1 relays in the network, then the signals will be
transmitted via N hops through the end-to-end route from the source to the destination, and
the distance between the transmitter and receiver of each hop can be denoted as dtr =
L
N
. The
system model of this linear relaying network is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The wireless channels between the terrestrial nodes are subject to a small-scale Rayleigh fading
together with a large-scale path loss. The path loss exponent is α. The Rayleigh fading coefficient
for the n-th hop is denoted as hn, which is modeled as an independent complex Gaussian variable
with zero mean and unit variance, i.e. hn ∼ CN (0, 1). For the air-to-ground channels, we adopt
the hybrid model proposed in [13]. Specifically, we suppose that the probability for each path
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8being LoS is Plos, where the value of Plos primarily depends on the propagation environment and
the elevation angle [15]. The probability for the air-to-ground channel from the n-th terrestrial
transmitter node to the UAV being LoS can be expressed as
Plos(θn) =
1
1 + C exp(−B(θn − C)) , (1)
where B and C are constant depending on the environment and θn is the elevation angle which
can be further written as
θn =
180
π
sin−1
(
H
dnu
)
, (2)
with H representing the height of the UAV, and dnu the distance between the n-th transmitter
and the UAV. The probability for the path being NLoS is Pnlos(θn) = 1− Plos(θn).
The small-scale fading coefficient from the transmitter of the n-th hop to the UAV, denoted as
hnu, follows Rayleigh fading. For large-scale path loss, LoS and NLoS links possess different
fading coefficients anu, which can be expressed as:
anu =


√
λ0d
−β1/2
nu LoS link
√
ηλ0d
−β2/2
nu NLoS link
, (3)
where β1 and β2 represent the path loss exponents for the LoS link and NLoS link respectively,
λ0 is the path loss at the reference distance d0 = 1m, and η is the excessive path-loss coefficient,
which shows an additional attenuation due to the higher path loss of the NLoS connection.
Under the DF relaying protocol, at the n-th hop, the received signals of the n-th terrestrial
receiver and the UAV yRn and yEn are written as
yRn =
√
pnλ0hn
d
α/2
tr
xn + nRn and (4)
yEn =
√
pnanuhnuxn + nEn , (5)
respectively. xn and pn are the transmitted symbol and corresponding transmit power at the n-th
hop, respectively, and nRn and nEn represent the noise at the n-th terrestrial receiver and the
UAV following CN (0, σ20). Defining σ2 , σ
2
0
λ0
, the expressions of the corresponding SNR can
then be expressed as
SNRRn =
pn|hn|2
dαtrσ
2
and (6)
SNREn =
pna
2
nu|hnu|2
λ0σ2
. (7)
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9With the expressions of the received signals and SNRs as well as other notations above, in the
following, we formulate optimization problems in secrecy and covert transmissions, respectively.
Due to the differences between the secrecy and covert communications, different signaling
models, knowledge of the channel state information and optimization targets are assumed in
these two conditions.
A. Secrecy Transmission
We first consider the PLS transmission strategy under the eavesdropping of the UAV. Under
Wyner’s encoding scheme, different codebooks are adopted to retransmit the signal in multiple
DF hops, as proposed in [39]. Hence the UAV are not able to jointly decode the signals received
from multiple hops, but can only decode these signals individually. We denote the transmission
rate and secrecy rate in n-th hop as Rt,n and Rs,n, respectively.
For the n-th receiver on the end-to-end link, the legitimate node can decode the message
correctly if its channel capacity Ct,n is greater than the transmission rate Rt,n, i.e. Ct,n > Rt,n,
which is equivalent to SNRRn > γc,n , 2
Rt,n − 1. According to Wyner’s wiretap coding theory,
the transmission confidentiality fails when the capacity of the channel from the n-th transmitter
toward the UAV Ce,n is greater than the rate redundancy Re,n , Rt,n − Rs,n, i.e., Ce,n >
Re,n, which is equivalent to SNREn > γe,n , 2
Re,n − 1. Re,n reflects the ability to secure the
transmission against the wiretapping.
To convey the end-to-end confidential information under the multi-hop DF protocol and
guarantee the consistency of the message, the secrecy rates for all hops should be identical,
i.e,. Rs = Rs,1 = · · · = Rs,N , while Rt,n (and hence Re,n) can be different for different hops
[39]. Considering the complexity of the optimization problem when separate transmission rates
are adopted, in this paper we suppose that fixed-rate Rt is used to simplify the problem. Hence
we have Rt = Rt,1 = ...Rt,N . Based on this assumption and the independence of the received
signals for different hops, we now derive the definitions of the connection and secrecy outage
probabilities for an end-to-end link. The connection probability is defined as the probability that
each receiver can decode the message correctly, which can be written as:
Pc ,
∏
n
Pr (SNRRn > γc) , (8)
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where γc = 2
Rt − 1. The secrecy transmission occurs when SNREn for each hop is less than
γe = 2
Re − 1. Therefore, the secrecy outage probability can be defined as
Pso , 1−
∏
n
Pr (SNREn < γe) . (9)
The end-to-end secrecy throughput reflecting the spectral efficiency of a complete signal
transmission from the source to the destination [39], which is defined as
ΦS ,
1
N
PcRs. (10)
Our objective is to maximize the secrecy throughput for the multi-hop network under the secrecy
outage constraint as well as the sum power constraint, by optimizing the number of hops required,
the transmission rate, the secrecy rate and the transmit power for each node. The problem can
be formulated as
max
N,Rt,Rs,pn
1
N
PcRs (11a)
s.t. Pso ≤ ζ (11b)∑
n
pn ≤ PT , (11c)
in which ζ represents the constraint of Pso, and PT is the maximal value of sum power. This
problem will be solved in detail in Sec. III.
B. Covert Transmission
In this subsection, we consider the covert communication strategy for the multi-hop network.
The UAV has the ability to detect whether there exists signals transmitted. In order to avoid being
detected by the UAV, the network on the ground needs to design the transmission carefully.
In order to detect the existence of the signal transmission, the UAV is required to distinguish
between the following two hypotheses of the received signals:
yn(l) =


√
pnanhnuxn(l) + nEn(l) H1
nEn(l) H0
l = 1, ..., L. (12)
where L represents the length of the codeword in a channel coherent block. H1 denotes the
hypothesis that there is signal transmission on the ground, and H0 means no transmission
happening. To facilitate the analysis, xn(l) is supposed to be a phase shift keying (PSK) signal
with unit amplitude and its phase denoted as φ. Then under the hypothesis H1, we define
October 22, 2019 DRAFT
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h′nu , hnue
jφ, and h′nu still follows CN (0, 1). Therefore, the distribution of the received signal
at the UAV follows 
 CN (0, pna
2
n + σ
2
0) H1
CN (0, σ20) H0
(13)
As a detector, the UAV aims to make more correct decisions and maintain low possibility
of detection error which include the probability of missed detection and the probability of
false alarm PFA. The probability of missed detection PMD represents the possibility that the
UAV declares nonexistence of communication while the terrestrial nodes transmit signals, i.e.
PMD = P {H0|H1 is true}. While PFA denotes the condition when UAV declares the existence
of communication yet no signal transmission happens, i.e. PFA = P {H1|H0 is true}.
We assume that the UAV makes a decision based on all signals it received on the multi-hop
transmission. To guarantee the covertness, the probability of detection error must satisfy
PMD + PFA ≥ 1− ǫ, (14)
where ǫ can reflect the strictness of the constraint on the detection error rate and usually has a
small value. Assuming that the UAV performs the optimal test, then according to the Pinsker’s
inequality [27], we can obtain a lower boundary of the probability of detection error expressed
as
PMD + PFA ≥ 1−
√
1
2
D(Q1||Q0), (15)
where Q1 (Q0) represents the joint probability distribution of all the UAV’s received signals
when hypothesis H1 (H0) is true. D(Q1||Q0) is the relative entropy between Q1 and Q0, and is
defined as
D(Q1||Q0) ,
∫
Q1(x) ln
Q1(x)
Q0(x)
dx. (16)
Considering (14) and (15) jointly, we can obtain
D(Q1||Q0) ≤ 2ǫ2. (17)
When (17) is satisfied, it is undoubtedly that (14) is also satisfied. Therefore, (17) is a tighter
constraint on the detection error rate PMD + PFA.
Similar to the secrecy transmission condition, different code books are adopted to re-transmit
the signals in multiple DF hops. Hence the received signals over different hops are independent
with each other, and we have
Qi =
N∏
n=1
Q
(n)
i , i = 0, 1, (18)
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in which Q
(n)
i is the joint probability distribution of the UAV’s received signals over the n-th hop
under hypothesis Hi. Due to the definition of relative entropy and the independence of received
signals over different hops,
D(Q1||Q0) =
∑
n
D(Q
(n)
1 ||Q(n)0 ). (19)
In covert communication situation, the terrestrial network cares little about confronting UAV’s
decoding and the secrecy rate, which differs from the secrecy communication. We consider
transmit throughput ΦC , PcRt/N to reflects the transmission efficiency. The optimization
objective is to maximize the end-to-end transmit throughput ΦC under constraints on the relative
entropy D(Q1||Q0) and sum of transmit power over different hops. The optimization problem
can be formulated as
max
N,Rt,pn
1
N
PcRt (20a)
s.t. D(Q1||Q0) ≤ 2ǫ2, (20b)∑
n
pn ≤ PT . (20c)
Remark: The objectives in (11) and (20) can reflect the consideration on reliability and delay
in multi-hop transmissions. PC represents the probability that the destination can decode the mes-
sage correctly, which can reflect the network’s reliability. The number of hops N will influence
the delay of one source-destination transmission. In secrecy/covert transmission problems, both
PC and N would affect the security/covertness of the multi-hop network. To balance the security,
reliability and delay of the network, ΦS and ΦC are considered to optimize the performance of
multi-hop transmission networks.
Till now we have obtained the secrecy and covert communication problems in (11) and (20).
In the following two sections, we will provide comprehensive analysis and solution methods of
the two problems.
III. SECURITY TRANSMISSION OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we aim to solve the security transmission problem (11). We first provide
the closed-form expressions of the connection probability and the secrecy outage probability.
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According to the definition in (8), the connection probability for any given N is given by
Pc =
∏
n
Pr
{
pn|hn|2
dαtrσ
2
> γc
}
=
∏
n
Pr
{
|hn|2 > γcd
α
trσ
2
pn
}
= exp
(
−
∑
n
γcd
α
trσ
2
pn
)
, (21)
where (21) is due to the exponential distribution of the fading coefficient |hn|2.
Before obtaining the detailed expression of secrecy outage probability Pso for the end-to-end
transmission, we first consider the security probability at the n-th hop P ns , which can be defined
as
P ns , Pr(SNREn < γe)
(a)
= Plos(θn)Pr(SNREn < γe|LoS) + (1− Plos(θn)) Pr(SNREn < γe|NLoS)
= Plos(θn)Pr
(
|hnu|2 < γed
β1
nuσ
2
pn
)
+ (1− Plos(θn)) Pr
(
|hnu|2 < γed
β2
nuσ
2
ηpn
)
(b)≈ Pr
(
|hnu|2 < Plos(θn)γed
β1
nuσ
2
pn
+ (1− Plos(θn)) γed
β2
nuσ
2
ηpn
)
= 1− exp
(
−γeσ
2
ηpn
(
Plos(θn)ηd
β1
nu + (1− Plos(θn)) dβ2nu
))
, (22)
where (a) holds for the probability distribution of the LoS and NLoS air-to-ground channels,
and (b) is due to the Jensen’s inequality. Substituting (22) into (9), the secrecy outage probability
of the entire path is
Pso = 1−
N∏
n=1
P ns
= 1−
N∏
n=1
{
1− exp
(
−γeσ
2
ηpn
(
Plos(θn)ηd
β1
nu + (1− Plos(θn)) dβ2nu
))}
.
(23)
(21) and (23) indicate that the increase of transmit power can lead to the raise of both probabilities
of connection and information leakage. Therefore, the transmit power is required to be designed
carefully in order to optimize the secrecy performance of the multi-hop network.
From (21) and (23), we know that the connection probability Pc is a function of N , Rt and
pn. Meanwhile, Rt and pn are coupled with Rs due to the constraint of the secrecy outage
probability shown in (11b). Hence Pc can be expressed as the function of all variables N, pn, Rt,
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and Rs. Therefore, problem (11a) can be solved by optimizing N , Rs, Rt, and pn sequentially,
i.e.
max
N,Rt,Rs,pn
1
N
PcRs ⇔ max
N
1
N
(
max
Rs
Rs
(
max
Rt,pn
Pc
))
. (24)
Based on the expressions of the connection probability and secrecy outage probability of the
multi-hop network, we propose a method to solve this problem and provide a globally optimal
solution1. The method can be divided into three parts: First, we optimize the transmit power
p∗n and R
∗
t for each node under any given Rs and N ; Then the optimal R
∗
s under any N is
optimized further; Finally, the number of hops optimizing the throughput is found. In each part,
the specific expressions of the optimal transmit powers, transmission rate, and secrecy rate are
derived, and the optimal number of hops can be obtained using a one-dimensional searching
method.
A. Transmit Power and Rate Optimization
In this part, we focus on optimizing the transmit power pn and transmission rate with fixed
values of Rt and N under the secrecy outage constraint. This sub-problem can be written as the
following form:
max
pn,Rt
exp
(
−
∑
n
γcd
α
trσ
2
pn
)
(25a)
s.t. 1−
∏
n
{
1− exp
(
−γeσ
2
ηpn
(
Plos(θn)ηd
β1
nu + (1− Plos(θn)) dβ2nu
))} ≤ ζ (25b)
∑
n
pn ≤ PT . (25c)
We define bn ,
σ2
η
(
Plos(θn)ηd
β1
nu + (1− Plos(θn)) dβ2nu
)
for brevity. Note that exp
(
−γebn
pn
)
rep-
resents the secrecy outage probability at the n-th hop and is usually much smaller than 1 (since
pso is constrained by a small ζ). Since
∏
(1 − xk) ≈ 1 −
∑
xk when 0 < xk ≪ 1 [37], (25b)
can be rewritten as ∑
n
exp
(
−γebn
pn
)
≤ ζ (26)
1Note that though some approximations have been applied, the solution is not locally optimal.
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Due to Rt = Rs +Re, under fixed value of Rs, finding the optimal value of Rt is equivalent to
optimizing Re (and therefore γe). Based on γe = 2
Rt−Rs − 1 and γc = 2Rt − 1, we can derive
γc = (γe + 1)2
Rs − 1. Setting tn , γe/pn, we can get the following optimization problem:
min
γe,tn
∑
n
tn
(γe + 1)2
Rs − 1
γe
(27a)
s.t.
∑
n
exp (−bntn) ≤ ζ (27b)
∑
n
γe
tn
≤ PT . (27c)
First, we focus on the optimization of γe under fixed tn. This problem is equivalent to
min
γe
(γe + 1)2
Rs − 1
γe
s.t.
∑
n
γe
tn
≤ PT .
(28)
It is clear that the objective function of (28) is decreasing with respect to γe. Therefore, (28)
reaches its optimum when the inequality constraint is active. Hence, we have
γ∗e =
PT∑
n 1/tn
. (29)
Next, we aim to optimize tn. With the approximation γc ≈ γe2Rs when γe is much larger than
1, the sub-optimization problem with respect to tn can therefore be written as
min
tn
∑
tn
s.t.
∑
tn
exp (−bntn) ≤ ζ.
(30)
This is a convex optimization problem and its globally optimal solution can be derived. Since the
objective function is non-decreasing while the left-hand side of the constraint is non-increasing,
this problem reaches its optimum when the inequality constraint is active. Using Lagrangian
multiplier method, we can formulate the following function:
G =
∑
n
tn + λ
{∑
n
exp (−bntn)− ζ
}
, (31)
where λ > 0 represents the Lagrange multiplier. Letting
∂G
∂tn
= 1− λ exp(−γebntn)γebn = 0, (32)
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and considering the active constraint, we can finally derive
tn =
1
bn
ln
(∑
k
bn
bkζ
)
, and (33)
λ =
1
ζ
∑
n
bn. (34)
Then substituting (33) into (29) and using tn = γe/pn and γe = 2
Rt−Rs − 1, the expressions of
the optimal γ∗e , p
∗
n and R
∗
t can be expressed as
γ∗e =
PT∑
n
bn
ln(bn
∑
k
1
ζbn
)
, (35)
p∗n =
γ∗ebn
ln
(∑
k
bn
bkζ
) , and (36)
R∗t = log2(γ
∗
e + 1) +Rs. (37)
From (35), it is clear that γe is a decreasing function of ζ , which indicates that as the secrecy
constraint getting relaxed (i.e. ζ increasing), less cost is required to confront the eavesdropping.
B. Secrecy Rate Optimization
Having obtained p∗n and R
∗
t , now we deal with the optimization of Rs under any given N .
The optimal R∗s that maximize ΦS can be expressed as
max
Rs
exp
(
−(γ
∗
e + 1)2
Rs − 1
γ∗e
A1
)
Rs. (38)
in which
A1 ,
∑
n
dαtrσ
2
bn
ln
∑
k
bn
bkζ
. (39)
Proposition 1: Problem (38) is quasi-concave.
Proof 1: First, we derive the first derivative of the objective function with respect to Rs, which
can be written as
d
dRs
exp
(
−(γ
∗
e + 1)2
Rs − 1
γ∗e
A1
)
Rs = exp
(
−(γ
∗
e + 1)2
Rs − 1
γ∗e
A1
)(
1− A1 ln 2
γ∗e
(γ∗e + 1)2
RsRs
)
.
Let the first derivative equal to zero, and we obtain
1− A1
γ∗e
(γ∗e + 1) ln 2 · 2RsRs = 0, (40)
which can be transformed as
γ∗e
A1(γ∗e + 1)
= eln 2·Rs ln 2 · Rs.
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Hence, the solution of (40) is
R∗s =
1
ln 2
W0
(
γ∗e
A1(γ∗e + 1)
)
, (41)
where W0(·) represents the principal branch of the Lambert W function.
The second derivative of the objective function with respect to Rs can be expressed as
d2
dRs
2 exp
(
−(γ
∗
e + 1)2
Rs − 1
γ∗e
A1
)
Rs
=exp
(
−(γ
∗
e + 1)2
Rs − 1
γ∗e
A1
)(
−A1(γ
∗
e + 1)
γ∗e
ln 2 · 2Rs
)(
2 + ln 2
(
1− A1
γ∗e
(γ∗e + 1)2
Rs
)
Rs
)
,
(42)
When the first derivative equals to zero, due to (40), we have
2 + ln 2
(
1− A1
γ∗e
(γ∗e + 1)2
Rs
)
Rs = 1 + ln 2 · Rs > 0, (43)
and (42) is less than 0. Therefore, (38) is quasi-concave in Rs. 
Based on Proposition 1, problem (38) reaches its optimum when (40) holds, and the optimal
secrecy rate R∗s can be calculated via (41).
C. Number of Hops Optimization
Finally, the number of hops N remains to be optimized. Having obtained the expressions
of the optimal p∗n, R
∗
t and R
∗
s through (36), (37) and (41), the throughput optimization can be
rewritten as
max
N
ΦS =
1
N
exp
{
−A1
γ∗e
[
(γ∗e + 1)2
1
ln 2
W0
(
γ∗e
A1(γ
∗
e+1)
)
− 1
]}
1
ln 2
W0
(
γ∗e
A1(γ∗e + 1)
)
, (44)
where γ∗e and A1 are both functions of N . The expression of ΦS is quite complicated w.r.t N ,
which makes it hard to get a specific closed-form expression for the optimal number of hops N∗.
Nevertheless, N can be derived via a one-dimensional searching in the set of positive integers,
which is efficient for practice networks. The numerical results of N∗ are shown in Section V.
Till now, we have finished the optimization of security transmission problem. For any given
number of hops N , the secrecy rate, transmission rate, and transmit power can be optimized
according to the closed-form expressions (41), (37), and (36) sequentially, and (N + 2) values
are calculated. Supposing the optimal number of hops is searched from 1 to N˜ , the number of
values to be computed in the entire procedure is in the order of O(N˜2) .
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IV. COVERT COMMUNICATION OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we discuss the solution of the covert communication optimization problem
(20). Since Pc is the function of Rt and pn, similar to (24), (20) can be solved by optimizing
N , Rt, and pn sequentially, i.e.,
max
N,Rt,pn
1
N
PcRt ⇔ max
N
1
N
(
max
Rt
Rt
(
max
pn
Pc
))
, (45)
The procedure to solve problem (20) can be separated into three steps: First, under any given N
and Rt, the transmit power pn is optimized; Then we derive the optimal Rt for a given number
of hops. Finally, the optimal N is obtained to maximize the throughput.
A. Transmit Power Optimization
We first derive the expression of the relative entropy D(Q
(n)
1 ||Q(n)0 ). As previously stated, the
possibility for the n-th air-to-ground channel being line-of-sight is Plos(θn) while for the path
being NLoS is Pnlos(θn). Therefore, for the n-th hop, we have
D(Q
(n)
1 ||Q(n)0 ) = D
[
(Plos(θn)Q
(n)
1,los + Pnlos(θn)Q
(n)
1,nlos)||Q(n)0
]
,
where Q
(n)
1,los (Q
(n)
1,nlos) denote the joint probability distribution of the received signals on the n-th
hop when the air-to-ground channel is LoS (NLoS) and H1 is true. Furthermore, due to the
convexity of F (t) , t ln t
a
, we can derive
D(Q
(n)
1 ||Q(n)0 )
=
∫ [
Plos(θn)Q
(n)
1,los(x) + Pnlos(θn)Q
(n)
1,nlos(x)
]
ln
Plos(θn)Q
(n)
1,los(x) + Pnlos(θn)Q
(n)
1,nlos(x)
Q0(x)
dx
≤
∫ [
PlosQ
(n)
1,los(x) ln
Q
(n)
1,los(x)
Q0(x)
+ PnlosQ
(n)
1,nlos(x) ln
Q
(n)
1,nlos(x)
Q0(x)
]
dx (46)
= Plos(θn)D(Q
(n)
1,los||Q(n)0 ) + Pnlos(θn)D(Q(n)1,nlos||Q(n)0 )
= LPlos(θn)D(q
(n)
1,los||q(n)0 ) + LPnlos(θn)D(q(n)1,nlos||q(n)0 ). (47)
where q
(n)
1,los, q
(n)
1,nlos and q
(n)
0 represent the probability distribution of one received signal at the
UAV on the n-th hop when the air-to-ground channel are LoS, NLoS and when no transmis-
sion happens, respectively. (46) holds due to the Jensen’s inequality, and (47) holds for the
independence of received signals that are transmitted through the same hop.
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Now we can derive the specific expression of the relative entropy. For two complex Gaussian
distributions p = CN (µp, σ2p) and q = CN (µq, σ2q ), D(p||q) can be calculated via [33]
D(p||q) = ln σ
2
q
σ2p
+
σ2p
σ2q
+
(µq − µp)2
σ2q
− 1. (48)
Therefore, we can derive
D(q
(n)
1,los||q(n)0 ) =
pn
dβ1nuσ2
− ln
(
1 +
pn
dβ1nuσ2
)
and
D(q
(n)
1,nlos||q(n)0 ) =
ηpn
dβ2nuσ2
− ln
(
1 +
ηpn
dβ2nuσ2
)
.
Using ln(1 + x) ≥ x− x2/2 when x ≥ 0, we can get
D(q
(n)
1,los||q(n)0 ) ≤
1
2
(
pn
dβ1nuσ2
)2
and
D(q
(n)
1,nlos||q(n)0 ) ≤
1
2
(
ηpn
dβ2nuσ2
)2
.
As a result,
D(Q1||Q0) =
∑
n
D(Q
(n)
1 ||Q(n)0 ) (49)
≤
∑
n
[
Plos(θn)D(Q
(n)
1,los||Q(n)0 ) + Pnlos(θn)D(Q(n)1,nlos||Q(n)0 )
]
(50)
≤ L
2
∑
n
[
Plos(θn)
(
pn
dβ1nuσ2
)2
+ Pnlos(θn)
(
ηpn
dβ2nuσ2
)2]
, (51)
The constraint can be rewritten as
L
2
∑
n
[
Plos(θn)
(
pn
dβ1nuσ2
)2
+ Pnlos(θn)
(
ηpn
dβ2nuσ2
)2]
≤ 2ǫ2, (52)
which is much stricter than (17).
Now we tackle the transmit power optimization problem under any given N and Rt. The aim
of this subproblem is to maximize the connection probability Pc, which can be rewritten as
max
pn
exp
(
−
∑
n
γcd
α
trσ
2
pn
)
s.t.
L
2
∑
n
[
Plos(θn)
(
pn
dβ1nuσ2
)2
+ Pnlos(θn)
(
ηpn
dβ2nuσ2
)2]
≤ 2ǫ2,
∑
n
pn ≤ PT ,
(53)
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and is equivalent to
min
pn
∑
n
1
pn
s.t.
L
2
∑
n
[
Plos(θn)
(
pn
dβ1nuσ2
)2
+ Pnlos(θn)
(
ηpn
dβ2nuσ2
)2]
≤ 2ǫ2,
∑
n
pn ≤ PT .
(54)
This is a convex problem with respect to pn and its globally optimal solution can be obtained
numerically. From (54) we can discover that with a larger value of ǫ, the nodes would transmit
signals with larger power, which would increase the possibility that the UAV makes correct
decision.
B. Transmission Rate and Number of Hops Optimization
With the optimal transmission power p˜∗n, now we solve the optimization problem of the
transmission rate Rt and the number of hops N .
The sub-problem toward the optimization of Rt for a fixed N can be expressed as
max
Rt
exp
(− (2Rt − 1)A2)Rt, (55)
where A2 ,
∑
n
dαtrσ
2
p˜∗n
. This is a quasi-concave problem and reaches its optimum when its first
derivative equals to zero. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1, and therefore is omitted
here. The optimal transmission rate R˜∗t can be expressed as
R˜∗t =
1
ln 2
W0
(
1
A2
)
. (56)
Having obtained the expressions of p˜∗n and R˜
∗
t , the throughput optimization problem can be
rewritten as
max
N
1
N
exp
(
−
(
2
(
1
ln 2
W0
(
1
A2
))
− 1
)
A2
)
1
ln 2
W0
(
1
A2
)
. (57)
Though this problem is too complicated to derive a specific closed-form solution, the optimal
number of hops can be obtained via a one-dimensional searching in the set of positive integers,
which is efficient for practice networks.
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Fig. 2: The transmission rate Rt versus the secrecy outage probability constraint ζ under fixed
number of hops N and h = 300m.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the numerical results to illustrate the performance of the proposed
two methods toward the secrecy and covert communication problems, respectively. We suppose
that the distance between the source and the destination nodes is D = 300m. The UAV is located
at a height of h, exactly above the midpoint between the source and the destination nodes, and
the path loss exponents of the terrestrial and air-to-ground channels are α = 3, β1 = 2.5, and
β2 = 2.8, respectively [40]. Considering an urban environment, the parameters B and C are set
as B = 0.136 and C = 11.95 under f = 2, 000MHz with the excessive path-loss coefficient
η = −20dB [13], [14]. The working bandwidth of the system is 10MHz, with the noise power
σ20 = −110dBm and the path loss at reference distance d0 = 1m is set as λ0 = −40dB. Thus,
we can obtain σ2 = −70dBm.
A. Performance of the Secrecy Communication Optimization Scheme
In this part, we discuss the performance of the secrecy communication optimization scheme.
The influence of the system parameters toward the optimal transmission rate, secrecy rate and
the secrecy throughput is first investigated. Fig. 2 and 3 depict the optimized transmission rate
and secrecy rate versus the variation of the SOP threshold ζ under different numbers of hops
N . As ζ increases, the transmission rate Rt decreases while the secrecy rate Rs increases. The
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Fig. 3: The secrecy rate Rs versus the secrecy outage probability constraint ζ under fixed number
of hops N and h = 300m.
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Fig. 4: The secrecy throughput ΦS versus the secrecy outage probability constraint ζ under fixed
number of hops N and h = 300m.
relaxation of the secrecy outage requirement enables the legitimate nodes to decrease Re, which
reflects the cost toward securing the confidential transmission against eavesdropping. Meanwhile,
the increase of Rs indicates that more information can be transmitted securely. Besides, as the
number of hops N increases, the distance between two adjacent nodes becomes shorter, leading
to a decrease of required transmit power for a successful connection. In such cases, secrecy
outage is less likely to happen, and both Rt and Rs can be enhanced so as to transmit more
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Fig. 5: The secrecy throughput ΦS versus the height of UAV h when N = 7.
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Fig. 6: The secrecy throughput ΦS versus the number of hops N under fixed secrecy outage
probability constraint ζ . The maximal values of ΦS are marked using circles.
information.
The throughput ΦS versus ζ under different values of N are calculated according to (10) and
the results are plotted in Fig. 4. It is clear that the throughput increases with the secrecy outage
constraint being relaxed. Besides, among the three choices of N , the network throughput does
not always reaches the maximum at the biggest value of N . Specifically, when ζ > 0.03, the
maximal throughput is achieved as N = 30. This indicates the existence of an optimal value of
N to provide the optimal trade-off.
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Fig. 5 reflects the impact of UAV’s height on the secrecy throughput with different ζ when
the number of hops is fixed as N = 7. With the increase of UAV’s height, the throughput first
decreases and then increases gradually. This is because when the UAV has a low altitude, as h
increases, the throughput grows lower due to the better qualities of wiretapping channels. As h
keeps increasing, however, the influence of path loss becomes prominent. Hence the qualities of
received signals at the UAV get worse, and more bits can be transmitted.
For comparison, we also consider a benchmark scheme (denoted as eq. pow.) in which all
terrestrial transmitter have equal power, and the transmit power, Rt, Rs and N are optimized
following a procedure similar to the proposed method in Section III (denoted as opt. pow.).
As shown in Fig. 5, for secrecy communications, our proposed scheme with different transmit
power outperforms that with equal power for each node.
Then we investigate the relation between the number of hops N and the throughput ΦS and
aim to find the optimal number of hops. As plotted in Fig. 6, as N increases, ΦS first increases
and then decreases. The maximal value of the throughput is marked with a circle on each curve
in the figure, and the corresponding N is exactly the optimal number of hops. For example,
when ζ = 0.1, h = 300, the maximal throughput is obtained when there exist 21 hops in the
linear relaying network.
B. Performance of the Covert Communication Optimization Scheme
The performance of the covert communication optimization scheme is discussed in this part.
We assume that the length of the code word L = 10. The influence of the system parameters
toward optimized variables is studied. The optimal transmit power, transmission rate and through-
put versus ǫ over different values of N are plotted in Fig. 7, Fig. 8, and Fig. 9, respectively.
The average transmit power, defined as Pave ,
1
N
∑
n pn, increases as ǫ becomes larger while
decreases as N increases. The increase of ǫ indicates a looser constraint on the detection error
rate, which allows the transmitters to enhancing their transmit power without violating the covert
transmission constraint. As N increases, the distance for one hop becomes shorter, and less power
is required to transmit the signal. In Fig. 8, as ǫ increases, Rt becomes higher accordingly.
The relaxation of covert constraint enables the increase of transmit power, which leads to the
enhancement of received SNR at each terrestrial receiver and a higher channel capacity. Hence
more bits can be transmitted.
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Fig. 7: The average transmit power Pave versus the detection probability constraint κ under fixed
number of hops N and h = 300m.
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Fig. 8: The transmission rate Rt versus the detection probability constraint κ under fixed number
of hops N and h = 300m.
The throughput ΦC is calculated and the results are depicted in Fig. 9. It is clear that the
throughput performance does not always becomes better with the increase of the number of
hops. In particular, when ǫ is higher than 0.05, ΦC reaches the maximum when there are 80
hops among the three provided values of N , while increasing N to 120 could not lead to a better
performance. This indicates the existence of an optimal number of hops.
The impact of UAV’s height on the transmit throughput with different ζ and fixed N can be
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Fig. 9: The transmit throughput ΦC versus the detection probability constraint κ under fixed
number of hops N and h = 300m.
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Fig. 10: The transmit throughput Φc versus the height of UAV h when N = 3.
reflected from Fig. 10. As h increases from a very low altitude, the throughput first becomes
smaller due to the better qualities of wiretapping channels. Then as h keeps increasing, path loss
becomes the dominant impact that worsens the qualities of UAV’s received signals. Hence the
throughput gradually increases.
In Fig. 10, we also compare the proposed scheme in Section IV (denoted as opt. pow.) with
a benchmark scheme (denoted as eq. pow.) in which each terrestrial transmitter has identical
power and the transmit power, Rt and N are optimized following a procedure similar to the
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Fig. 11: The transmit throughput ΦC versus the number of hops N under fixed detection
probability constraint κ. The maximal values of ΦC are marked using circles.
proposed method. As the numerical results show, the scheme with optimized transmit power
outperforms that with equal power for each node in covert communication.
The relation between the number of hops N and the throughput ΦC is studied and the optimal
numbers of hops under different values of ǫ are derived. As depicted in Fig. 11, ΦC first increases
and then decreases with the increase of N . The optimal values for different values of ǫ are
marked on the curves. ΦC reaches its optimum at N = 133, 46, and 29 when h = 500m and
κ = 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1, respectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the problem of secure communication and covert communi-
cation for a pair of terrestrial legitimate users. To work against the surveillance of the UAV,
multiple relays were deployed to assist the transmission. Considering the trade-off between
the secrecy/covertness and the efficiency of the multi-hop transmission, the optimization of
the transmit power, coding rates, and the number of hops was investigated to maximize the
throughput. In the secrecy problem, the expressions of the connection probability and the secrecy
outage probability were derived. The optimal transmit power and coding rates could be obtained
via closed-form expressions and the optimal number of hops was also evaluated. For covert
communication problem, the UAV’s detection error rate was constrained. The sub-problem
of transmit power optimization was convex and the global optimal solution could be derived
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numerically. Numerical simulation illustrated the performance of multi-hop networks. Since the
secrecy and covert communication problems were discussed under different assumptions and
had different targets, comparing the results under the two different conditions was meaningless.
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